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THE PROCESS Is THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A 
LOWER CRIMINAL COURT.* By Malcolm M. Feeley. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 1979. Pp. xxii, 330. $12.95. 
To the outsider, the New Haven Court of Common Pleas is cha-
otic and confusing. The courtroom is always noisy and crowded, 
and the actors - defendants, judges, prosecutors, public defenders, 
private attorneys, bail bondsmen, clerks, and bailiffs - move 
through their roles so quickly that justice seems lost in a dizzying 
blur. Motions are rare, and trials so infrequent that public defenders 
arrange their files on the rails of the jury box while secretaries dis-
pense forms from the witness stand. Professor Malcolm Feeley 
transforms this confusion into understanding in his thorough case 
study, The Process Is the Punishment. 
Commentators have long recognized that lower criminal courts 
differ from those handling more serious crimes;1 Feeley is among the 
first to explain why they function so differently. Chapter by chapter, 
he develops insights that challenge the reader's preconceptions about 
the people and process that dispense criminal justice. Carefully, he 
develops a thematic picture of the logic behind the system. He 
paints the lower court as a marketplace - an open arena where par-
ties with conflicting goals bargain their way to a legal result. In this 
environment, justice is normative rather than procedural: the quest 
for the "right" result preoccupies actors who are freed from formal 
rules of procedure and evidence. And those actors are always aware 
that the pretrial process's costs for a defendant outweigh the costs of 
the sentence. Thus, the title and thesis of Feeley's study - the proc-
ess is the punishment - is also the key to understanding the world 
he describes. 
The first part of the book meticulously describes the environ-
ment, structure, and actors that constitute the Court of Common 
Pleas. The docket includes minor felonies (those with maximum 
sentences of five years or less) as well as misdemeanors. The typical 
defendants are failures - poor, unemployed, and encumbered by 
alcohol or drugs. The judges, prosecutors, public defenders, and 
even the clerks and secretaries obtain their jobs through political pat-
ronage, which values experience with the conflict and compromise of 
partisan politics more than formal legal training. A detailed look at 
bail bondsmen produces surprising conclusions. They are "gregari-
• This book review was prepared by an Editor of the Michigan Law Review.-Ed. 
1. Professor Samuel Dash emphasized this difference more than a quarter of a century ago. 
See Dash, Cracks in the Foundations of Justice, 46 ILL. L. REv. 385 (1951). 
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ous and friendly, always ready with a friendly word," (p. 106), and 
they provide desired services for defendants, attorneys, and court 
personnel alike. Feeley gives more cursory treatment to those who 
round out the lower court setting: bail commissioners, pretrial ser-
vice representatives, and auxiliary court personnel. 
Professor Feeley describes the case-resolution process in the sec-
ond part of the book and compares it to a competitive marketplace. 
Trials are rare; there were none in Feeley's sample of more than 
1600 cases. In virtually all cases either the prosecutor dismisses the 
charges or the defendant pleads guilty.2 Because the adversaries al-
most invariably settle, with only a summary ratification by the judge, 
Feeley examines the process by which these agreements are reached. 
Contrary to the plea-bargaining model, in which prosecution and de-
fense are already agreed on the facts of a case and simply trade re-
duced charges for a guilty plea, Feeley observes that prosecutors and 
defense attorneys debate the facts of the charge and the circum-
stances of the defendent to gauge the "worth" of each case. As in a 
supermarket, prices for different "goods" have been established - a 
dime for an apple, a $25 fine for a second petty theft by a young man 
with significant community ties. Parties spend their time arguing 
ove_r what type of good is being purchased. Both sides see the objec-
tive of the debate as substantive, and not procedural, justice. 
In the final part of the book, Feeley explains that for defendants 
it is the cost o_f the process, and not the outcome, that is paramount. 
Sentences are usually lenient, with few long jail terms and frequent 
fines of $25 or less. And defendants are unconcerned with the stigma 
of conviction or the long-run consequences of a criminal record. 
The costs of obtaining bail, missing work to attend court, and retain-
ing an attorney are far more severe than the sentence. Defendants 
plead guilty because it saves them time and money; the costs of as-
serting due process rights of trial and appeal far outweigh potential 
benefits. In the marketplace, defendants with a minor purchase seek 
to minimize their time waiting in line, and pleading guilty opens up 
the express lane. Feeley's message is clear: once one realizes the 
high cost of invoking rights, the existence and value of those rights 
are called into question. Feeley concludes with reflections on the 
adjudicative ideal and rejects the "heavy-caseload" explanation for 
the pretrial dispensation of criminal justice. 3 
Because the author spices provocative analysis with fascinating 
2. Feeley's extensive statistical analysis failed to explain the variation in adjudicative out-
comes and sentences. 
3. The Process Is the Punishment manifests few of the weaknesses that Lynn Mather found 
in Milton Heumann's recent book on plea bargaining in Connecticut, M. HEUMANN, PLEA 
BARGAINING (1978). See Mather, Book Review, 77 MICH. L. REV. 884 (1979), Unlike 
Heumann, Feeley exerted considerable efforts to distinguish the Court of Common Pleas from 
the Superior Court and to explore organizational and structural variables. 
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vignettes from his months in the courtroom, The Process Is the Pun-
ishment can easily be read in two or three evenings. When the last 
page is turned, one is left with feelings of relief and disappointment: 
relief that parties are seeking substantive justice (however biased 
their perceptions of it may be) rather than capriciously deciding out-
comes; disappointment that, in the final analysis, there just isn't 
much "majesty of the law" in lower criminal courts. One book can-
not bridge the gap in a literature that has directed nearly all atten-
tion to the handling of major felonies. Yet Feeley's case study is a 
fine attempt to kindle interest in lower courts and their handling of 
minor offenses. His combination of thorough empirical research 
with thoughtful analysis demands to be read, criticized, and savored. 
